ドッド＝フランク法の現状 － 2013年5月上旬 資本比率をめぐって
ドッド＝フランク法は２０１０年７月に成立した法案である。以降、この実施に向けておどろくほど多数の改定が施されてきている。共和党や金融界ロビイイストの妨害的活動も含め、じつにさまざまなことが提起されてきた。たとえばCFPBの局長人事をめぐってのエリザベス・ワレン排斥にみられるように、CFPBを極力弱小化する活動など。
５月の段階では、これまでのドッド＝フランク法の具体化の過程をめぐって、２つの評価が見られる。１つは、骨抜きにされてしまう過程であるという悲観的なもの、もう１つは、金融規正法としてうまく成立してきているという楽観的なものである。
５月に問題になっていたのは、銀行にどれほどの資本を保有するのを義務付けるかいなかをめぐるものであった。さらにはそのポートフォリオをどう考えるのか、など。これをドッド＝フランク法に明記するのがよいかどうかといった議論である。
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Dodd-Frank is finally being implemented. Will that be enough?
By Mike Konczal, Published: May 6, 2013 at 11:08 am
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Specifically, Sens. Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) and David Vitter (R-La.) have introduced their bill that would dramatically increase capital requirements for banks by writing them explicitly into the law. Wonkblog covered the nuts-and-bolts of a leaked version of the bill here, and the current version of the bill is similar in the basics. This bill will inform post-Dodd Frank financial reform, so let’s discuss the context for this bill rolling out.
How Has Dodd-Frank Gone?
First off is understanding how Dodd-Frank has gone. One narrative argues that the bill’s regulations are getting picked apart during the rule-writing process. Two recent, excellent longreads of this narrative come from Haley Sweetland Edwards of the Washington Monthly and Gary Rivlin of The Nation.
On the other side, some argue that Dodd-Frank has ended Too Big To Fail. The process known as resolution authority, which would allow FDIC to take over and wind down any large financial firm, is coming together well enough that no financial firm is exempt from failure. Imposing higher capital requirements would then be a dangerous, costly and unnecessary addition to financial reform. Mary John Miller, under secretary of the Treasury, has given speeches to this effect, as well as financial industry lobbyists. (As David Dayen noted at The American Prospect, sometimes the same arguments and data points are being deployed by both the Treasury and the financial industry.)
One should note that saying higher capital is unnecessary because the FDIC can fail firms is like saying that since cars have airbags there’s no need for speed limits. There’s no contradiction between these two arguments at all. Former FDIC chairwoman Sheila Bair, for instance, has recently argued that resolution authority is coming along well in ending Too Big To Fail while also calling for a much higher 8 percent leverage ratio. These regulations complement each other.
Those in favor of a higher capital requirement often rely on arguments that there’s a “subsidy” in the cost of funding large banks receive. Though that argument is important, it isn’t necessary for something like Brown-Vitter to pass, because there are many other reasons we’d want to bump up capital requirements.
Higher capital also acts as a backstop on other problems that we can’t anticipate. Whatever the dubious financial innovation of 2043 is going to be – asteroid-backed holographic securities? – more capital will make that system more resilient. This puts less pressure on having to get every other regulation perfect, or keep a system so dynamic it anticipates every problem.
It tightens Dodd-Frank by increasing already existing requirements, rather than bringing in a whole new regulatory infrastructure. One of the key innovations of Brown-Vitter – directly ensuring that capital requirements are graduated by size – allows for banks that genuinely benefit from being so big to be able to do so. For a bank that is failing, more capital gives regulators more time to intervene with these new resolution authority problems, crucially helping an untested solution. And it also helps with problems in estimating capital.
Two types of capital ratio
Sens. David Vitter (R-LA), left, and Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) introduce their financial reform bill this year. (Win McNamee/GETTY IMAGES)
The final Brown-Vitter tosses out the implementation of Basel III. It’s not clear why it does this, as Basel III has a lot of important parts. There are liquidity requirements designed to prevent short-term runs. There’s a capital buffer specially designed to prevent dividends and bonuses if banks start to run low on capital. It’s a major loss to financial reform to just give that up all.
But the big debate here is how to determine what counts as capital. There are two general approaches to capital requirements. One approach “risk-weights” the assets, which means you can hold less capital for assets that are deemed to be less risky. The other approach doesn’t adjust for risk, and has a simple “leverage ratio.” Basel III has both, but Brown-Vitter would toss out risk-weighting and have a much higher leverage ratio.
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